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Origins and Original Meaning (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate
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INTRODUCTION

With increasing frequency, law enforcement agencies are turning to sense-enhanced
searches.' In comparison to the traditional direct physical inspection of evidence by
law enforcement agents, sense-enhanced searches use sophisticated technology to
gather evidence.
Increasingly, regulation of sense-enhanced searches has occurred through statutes,
not through court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.2 This development has
led to scholarly debate, focusing on whether courts or legislatures should regulate
sense-enhanced searches.3
In an article published more than fifteen years ago, I suggested that the Fourth
Amendment could regulate sense-enhanced searches effectively.' I was wrong.
I now believe that the Fourth Amendment has no applicability to the vast majority
of sense-enhanced searches, because the Framers never intended that the amendment
would apply to such searches. When the Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment,
the Framers only intended to proscribe unlawful physical searches of residences.
The amendment prohibited physical trespasses into houses pursuant to a general
warrant, as well as warrantless house searches.' In cases that did not involve house
searches, the Fourth Amendment was simply inapplicable.
Part I of this Article reviews the current regulation of sense-enhanced searches.
This Part examines Supreme Court decisions on sense-enhanced searches, concluding
that such decisions are arbitrary and inconsistent. Part I examines the rise of statutes
as an important mechanism for regulating sense-enhanced searches. Finally, Part I
In this Article, I use the term "sense-enhanced search" to describe police examination
of a person or their property through the use of some method that provides information not
available to unaided sensory perceptions. This Article uses the term "physical search" to
describe the traditional police search, which relies on unaided sensory perception.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See infra Part I.C.
4 David E. Steinberg, Making Sense ofSense-EnhancedSearches,74 MINN. L. REv. 563,
613-27 (1990) [hereinafter Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches].
' I have developed this historical thesis in several articles. See David E. Steinberg, An
OriginalMisunderstanding,Akhil Amar and FourthAmendment History, 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 227 (2005) [hereinafter Steinberg, Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment History];

David E. Steinberg, The OriginalUnderstandingof UnreasonableSearches andSeizures,
56 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2004) [hereinafter Steinberg, The Original Understanding];David
E. Steinberg, High School Drug Testing and the Original Understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 263 (2003).
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discusses the scholarly debate about whether such high technology searches should
be regulated by legislatures through statutes or courts through interpretations of the
Fourth Amendment.
Part I of this Article reviews historical evidence on the original understanding of
the Fourth Amendment. To a remarkable degree, framing-era discussions of unreasonable searches and seizures all focused on a single, discrete problem--unlawful physical
trespasses into residences. Although the modem Supreme Court has assumed that
the Fourth Amendment was intended to regulate all searches and seizures, the historical
record provides little if any support for this assumption.
Part II of this Article reviews arguments that the Fourth Amendment should
evolve, or change as law enforcement technology changes. Unfortunately, such
"growing constitution" arguments lack content. If the Fourth Amendment should
evolve, then how should it evolve? Consider just one problem--aerial overflights
used by law enforcement officers for surveillance and evidence gathering.6 Should
the "evolving" Fourth Amendment permit such flights without regulation, permit
such flights only with a prior warrant, or prohibit such aerial surveillance altogether?
The problem with the descriptions of a growing Fourth Amendment is the lack of
a consensus about how the amendment should grow.
In short, the Fourth Amendment is no more applicable to most sense-enhanced
searches than the Second Amendment or the Eighth Amendment. When the Framers
enacted the Fourth Amendment, they never intended to regulate problems such as
sense-enhanced searches. Given the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment, the
regulation of powerful new search techniques should come from statutes written by
elected legislators.
I. THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS, AND SENSE-ENHANCED SEARCHES
The Supreme Court has failed to develop a coherent body of law that governs
sense-enhanced searches. Perhaps in light of this failure, today the law regulating
such searches increasingly comes from statutes enacted by Congress, rather than
from Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. Scholars have
expressed mixed reactions to the regulation of sense-enhanced searches by legislators rather than judges. Unfortunately, this scholarly debate often does not consider
the original understanding and purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
A. The Supreme Court'sSense-Enhanced Search Analysis
In my 1990 article, I noted three important variables in the Supreme Court's
sense-enhanced search cases: 1) physical trespass; 2) the aural/visual distinction; and
See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986).
6
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3) searches of the home.7 As I noted in 1990, the shakiness of these distinctions
"has resulted in unpredictable and inconsistent decisions."' As demonstrated by
more recent decisions, the Court's sense-enhanced search approaches rest on an
untenable foundation. 9
1. Physical Trespass
Courts are more likely to invalidate sense-enhanced searches that involve physical
trespass into a constitutionally protected area, as opposed to those searches that do
not involve any such trespass. The presence or absence of a physical trespass often
seems determinative in the Court's sense-enhanced search cases. In United States
v. Knotts,' ° the Court upheld the warrantless monitoring of a beeper located in a
defendant's car, as the car traveled across public streets.1 1 Conversely, in United
States v. Karo,12 the Court invalidated the warrantless monitoring of a beeper, which
one of the defendants had carried into a residence.13 And in Californiav. Ciraolo,"
the Court upheld the warrantless surveillance of the defendant's backyard from an
airplane, where the officers did not trespass into the defendant's backyard. 5
Although the presence or absence of a physical trespass seems significant in
many sense-enhanced search cases, other cases downplay the importance of a
physical trespass. In Kyllo v. United States, 16 the Supreme Court held that before
using a thermal imaging device to measure heat inside of a residence, federal agents
should have obtained a warrant. 17 In finding a Fourth Amendment violation, the
Court explicitly rejected the government's arguments that the agents did not need
a warrant because the thermal imaging device was located in a federal agent's car
parked on a public street.' 8 According to Justice Antonin Scalia, making Fourth
Amendment decisions turn on the presence of a physical trespass "would leave the
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-including imaging technology
that could discern all human activity in the home. ' 19
As the Kyllo decision correctly observes, the power of sense-enhanced searches
makes physical trespass increasingly irrelevant. As law enforcement officers rely
7 See Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, supra note 4, at 583-84.
8 Id. at 584.
9 See, e.g., Steinberg, The OriginalUnderstanding,supra note 5, at 1084.
'0 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
11 Id.

468 U.S. 705 (1984).
id.
14 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
12

13

15 Id.
16

533 U.S. 27 (2001).

id.
18 See id. at 35.
'9 Id. at 35-36.
17
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on sophisticated and powerful new search technologies, those officers will have
little reason to physically enter a suspect's property.2 ° In fact, such excursions would
subject the officers to unnecessary danger, and could cause a spooked suspect to
destroy evidence.
2. The Visual/Aural Distinction
The Court is far more likely to require a warrant when technology enhances aural
impressions, rather than visual impressions. In a series of cases, the Justices rejected
the warrantless use of wiretapping devices.21 In UnitedStates v. UnitedStates District
Court,22 Justice Lewis Powell wrote that "official eavesdropping" could "deter vigorous
23
citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation."
Typically, the Justices have been far more willing to permit vision-enhancing
devices without a warrant. In Kyllo v. United States,24 Justice Scalia explicitly
noted that "the lawfulness of warrantless visual surveillance of a home has still been
preserved. 2 5 In Califormiav. Ciraolo,26 the Justices upheld warrantless surveillance
of a suspect's backyard from an airplane.2 7 And in UnitedStates v. Knotts,28 the Court
held that law enforcement officers need not obtain a warrant before tracking a
beeper in a car.29 The Knotts Court emphasized that visual surveillance "would have
sufficed to reveal" all relevant facts.3 °
The continuing use of this aural/visual distinction is problematic. The assumption
that aural impressions are somehow more private than visual impressions is not
always accurate. Imagine that by using an extremely high resolution telescope, law
enforcement officers could read a suspect' s diary entries, written at a bedroom desk.
Clearly, this visual observation would invade a suspect's privacy.
Perhaps more fundamentally, some new technologies do not clearly augment
either the visual or aural senses. In Kyllo, the thermal imaging unit enhanced neither
See Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why PropertyDoes Not Define the
Limits of the Right Against UnreasonableSearches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REv. 889,
20

894 (2004) ("Now threats to privacy can arise without in any way implicating rights to
private property.").
2 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,323-24 (1972) (holding that
the warrantless use of a wiretap was unconstitutional); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
358-59 (1967) (same); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) (same).
22 407 U.S. at 314.
23

Id.

24

533 U.S. 27 (2001).

25

Id. at 32 (2001) (emphasis added).

26

476 U.S. 207 (1986).
Id. at 211-15.
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
Id. at 282.
id.

27
28
29
30

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:465

a federal agent's vision or hearing, but instead enhanced the agent's sense of touch.3'
And in United States v. Place,32 the particular sense enhanced by the use of a drug
detecting dog is not immediately clear.33 Perhaps the dog augmented a federal agent's
sense of smell. But even an extraordinarily magnified human sense of smell might
not detect some odors apparent to a dog. In short, some sense-enhancing search
techniques do not fall neatly into aural enhancing and visual enhancing categories.
3. The Home
Sense-enhanced search techniques that intrude on the home are subject to a more
searching review than techniques that do not involve surveillance of a residence.
As Justice Scalia wrote in Kyllo v. UnitedStates, protection of the home stands "'[aIt
the very core' of the Fourth Amendment."' Accordingly, the Kyllo Court struck down
the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device to detect heat emanating from a
residence. 5 And in United States v. Karo,36 the Justices held that law enforcement
officers could not monitor a beeper without a warrant when one of the suspects had
unknowingly carried the beeper into a residence. 7
Away from residences, the Justices have been far more willing to permit the use
of sense-enhancing technology. In United States v. Knotts,3 s the Court upheld the
warrantless monitoring of a beeper that had traveled in a defendant's car but had not
entered a residence. 39 And in UnitedStates v. Place,' the Court held that the use of
a drug-detecting dog at an airport was not even a "search," and was not constrained by
the Fourth Amendment in any way."
As with other sense-enhanced search factors, the Justices have not applied a
consistent scrutiny to surveillance of the home. While striking down the use of the
thermal imaging unit in Kyllo,42 the Court permitted warrantless aerial surveillance
of a residential backyard in Californiav. Ciraolo.4 3 If anything, the aerial surveillance
permitted in Ciraolowas more intrusive than the thermal imaging search invalidated
in Kyllo. The thermal imaging unit only would inform federal agents about the heat
"' See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
32 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that the limited intrusion resulting from a canine
sniff was not a search and was not covered by the Fourth Amendment).
33 Id.

34 Kyllo, 533 U.S.
31 Id. at40-41.

at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,511 (1961)).

468 U.S. 705 (1984).
at 714.
38 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
39Id. at 285.
40 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
41 Id. at 707.
42 Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27.
43 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
36

37 Id.
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emanating from a suspect's house." Conversely, "[t]he indiscriminate nature of [the]
aerial surveillance" in Ciraolowould allow law enforcement officers to view a variety
of private activities not only in a suspect's backyard, but also in the backyards of the
suspect's neighbors.45
4. Summary
The Supreme Court has determined the Fourth Amendment legality of senseenhanced searches based on the presence of physical trespass, the visual/aural
distinction, and the extent to which search techniques intrude on the home. These
analytic approaches are not entirely coherent and have not been applied consistently
by the Justices.
B. The Emerging Statutory Regime
Most law school classes on Criminal Procedure emphasize the Fourth Amendment,
while giving little if any attention to federal statutes.46 But, at least with respect to
sense-enhanced searches: "Fourth Amendment protection continues to recede from
47
a litany of law enforcement activities, and it is being replaced by federal statutes."
With increasing frequency, regulation of sense-enhanced searches has taken
place through federal statutes, rather than the Fourth Amendment. In Katz v. United
States," the Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers must obtain a wan-ant
before installing a wiretap.' However, the important practical restrictions on wiretaps
appear not in a Supreme Court Fourth Amendment opinion, but rather in a federal
statute-Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title
fII). 5° Title III specifies the requirements for a wiretap application,5' and the standards
that a judge must apply in determining whether to grant the application.5 2

44 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
41 See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 225 (Powell, J., dissenting). In his Ciraolo dissent, Justice

Lewis F. Powell, Jr. observed that Dante Ciraolo's yard "contained a swimming pool and a
patio for sunbathing and other private activities." Id. at 222 n.7.
' See Joseph D. Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of
ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure:The Contributionof the Departmentof Justice'sOffice
of Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 395, 395 n.3 (1989).
" Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and ProfessorKerr's Misguided
Callfor JudicialDeference, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 747, 747 (2005).
48 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
49

Id.

" Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,82 Stat. 197
(current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2582).
51 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(3), 2518(1) (2000).
52 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000).
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In the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Congress specified
regulations of "pen registers" and "trap and trace" devices.53 A pen register is a
"device or process which records or decodes ... information transmitted by an
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted."'
A trap and trace device is a mechanism that "captures the incoming electronic or
other impulses which identify the originating number.. ." or signaling information
that is "reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication. 55
Under the ECPA, the government must obtain a court order to use these devices.56
Unlike a traditional search warrant, the order may be obtained with a lesser showing
than probable cause. 7
Soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001.58 Among other things, the
Patriot Act expanded the ECPA to cover searches that identify the source of emails,
as well as internet protocol addresses.59 The Patriot Act also expanded the information
that the government may obtain from internet service providers (ISPs).'
In recognizing the increased regulation of sense-enhanced searches through
statutes, one should not overlook the continuing importance of Fourth Amendment
doctrine. Some very important sense-enhanced search technologies are not covered
by any statutes and are governed solely by Fourth Amendment decisions. These
sense-enhanced search techniques include aerial surveillance,6 beeper tracking,6 2
and thermal imaging units.63
Nonetheless, the trend is toward regulation of new law enforcement technologies
through statutes enacted by Congress, rather than through Supreme Court interpretations
" Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508 §§ 301,302, 100
Stat. 1848, 1868-72 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
14 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (Supp. 1 2001).
" Id. § 3127(4).
56 Id. § 3121(a).
57 See id. § 3123.
58 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
59 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (Supp. 1 2001).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2000).
6! See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986) (upholding
warrantless aerial surveillance of a manufacturing compound); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986) (upholding warrantless aerial surveillance of a residential backyard).
62 Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716-18 (1984) (holding that law
enforcement officers violated the Fourth Amendment when the officers monitored a beeper
inside a residence without first obtaining a warrant) with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 284-85 (1983) (holding that police officers need not obtain a warrant before monitoring
a beeper carried through the public streets in a suspect's car).
63 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40-41 (2001) (holding that before law
enforcement officers use a thermal imaging device to measure the heat radiating from a
suspect's residence, the officers first must obtain a warrant).
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of the Fourth Amendment. As discussed below, scholars have expressed mixed
reactions to this trend.
C. The Response from the Academy

Having observed the trend toward regulation of sense-enhanced searches through
statutes rather than court decisions, Fourth Amendment scholars have offered a mixed
response. Professor Orin Kerr has argued that when law enforcement officers use
new sense-enhanced searches to uncover evidence, courts "should place a thumb on
the scale in favor of judicial caution... [while] allowing legislatures to provide the
primary rules governing law enforcement investigations." Other scholars, including
Professors Sherry Colb and Daniel Solove, disagree with Professor Kerr's arguments
for judicial deference in favor of legislative regulation.65 Some of the principle
arguments for and against such judicial deference are summarized below.
1. Unpredictability Versus Complexity
Since the 1967 decision in Katz v. United States,' courts have determined
whether law enforcement officers need a warrant based on whether a particular search
invaded a "reasonable expectation of privacy."6' 7 As Professor Kerr correctly observes,
this test is vague and circular, leading to unpredictable results. Professor Kerr writes:
"In this era of high-tech surveillance and the Internet, no one knows whether an
expectation of privacy in a new technology is 'reasonable. "68
Indeed, despite my familiarity with this area of law, I have been unable to predict
the Supreme Court's decisions in sense-enhanced search cases. In Kyllo v. United
States,69 the Supreme Court considered whether federal agents must obtain a warrant
before inspecting the outside of a house with a thermal imaging unit.7 ° Prior to the
Kyllo decision, I predicted that the Court would not require a warrant. The Court
previously had upheld warrantless surveillance of a suspect's backyard from an
airplane. 7' Such aerial surveillance would reveal far more private information about
a suspect than the thermal imaging unit, which merely would record the heat emanating
" Orin S. Kerr, The FourthAmendment and New Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths
and the Casefor Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 805 (2004).
65 See Colb, supra note 20; Solove, supra note 47.
66 389 U.S. 360 (1967)
67

Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).

68 Kerr, supra note 64, at 808.
69

533 U.S. 27 (2001)

70 Id.

71 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,213-15 (1986) (holding that when police officers

used an airplane to view marijuana plants growing in a fenced backyard, the officers did not
engage in a Fourth Amendment search, and the officers did need to obtain a warrant).
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from a suspect's house. I reasoned that if the aerial surveillance would not violate a
reasonable expectation of privacy, then the use of a thermal imaging unit also would
be permissible without a warrant.
However, the Supreme Court reached a different result. In Kyllo, the Court held
that the resident did have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the use
of the thermal imaging unit.72 Accordingly, the warrantless use of this unit was
unconstitutional. 73 Kyllo distinguished the aerial search case, concluding that mere
"visual observation is no 'search' at all. 74 In contrast, the agents in Kyllo invaded a
reasonable expectation of privacy by employing "a device that is not in general
public use, to explore the details of the home. 75
I have spent a considerable part of my professional life studying, teaching, and
writing about the Fourth Amendment. If I cannot accurately predict future Fourth
Amendment decisions, why should we expect police officers or prosecutors to make
accurate predictions?
Further, the consequences of an incorrect decision are substantial. If evidence is
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule typically requires
that a court must exclude this evidence.76 Because such physical evidence frequently
is highly probative, application of the exclusionary rule often means that the state
cannot successfully prosecute guilty defendants, who then go free.77
Unlike the vagueness of Fourth Amendment
doctrine, legislative regulation of
• 71
sense-enhanced searches can be very specific. Congress can pass statutes that regulate
72

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.

73 Id.
14

Id. at 32.

75 Id. at 40.

See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (the exclusionary rule applies in
state courts); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (the exclusionary rule applies
in federal courts).
The Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in some
circumstances, even where police officers have obtained evidence in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. For example, the Supreme Court has held that courts should not exclude
evidence "when an officer acting with objective good faith" relies on a valid search warrant.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,920 (1984); see also United States v. Havens, 446 U.S.
620, 627-28 (1980) (holding that illegally obtained evidence could be used to impeach a
defendant's credibility on cross-examination, when the cross-examination questions had been
suggested by a defense attorney's direct examination).
77 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,254-55 (1983) (noting that
"[b]ecause of the
inherent trustworthiness of seized tangible evidence and the resulting social costs from its
loss through suppression," application of the exclusionary rule has been carefully restricted);
Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples,107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 799 (1994)
[hereinafter Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles] (indicating as a result of the
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment "has lost its luster and become associated with
grinning criminals getting off on crummy technicalities").
76

78

See supra Part I.B.
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every conceivable use of technology by law enforcement. If the original statute
overlooks some situation, Congress may amend the statute.
But with this increased specificity comes increased complexity. In an attempt to
cover every imaginable situation, statutes often become extremely long and detailed.
For example, consider the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),79 which
governs investigations involving internet service providers and the use of pen registers.
As Professor Solove accurately observes, "the rules of the ECPA are notoriously
confusing and unclear.""0
The complexity of statutes providesfurther ammunition for scholars who believe
that the Fourth Amendment primarily should regulate sense-enhanced searches.
Unlike complicated statutory schemes, Fourth Amendment concepts tend to be
relatively accessible. Fourth Amendment standards such as the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" test, probable cause, and reasonable suspicion can be understood fairly
easily by lawyers and non-lawyers. But while the general Fourth Amendment concepts
are clear, the application of these vague concepts is far from certain.
These observations form one battlefield in the debate between those who favor
regulating sense-enhanced searches through the Fourth Amendment and those who
favor regulation by statutes. Scholars favoring regulation through the Fourth Amendment emphasize the accessibility of Fourth Amendment doctrine and the complexity
of statutes. Scholars favoring regulation by statutes emphasize the specificity of
statutory law and the vagueness of Fourth Amendment standards.
2. Delay Versus Haste
Fourth Amendment law tends to evolve slowly, with definitive decisions often
rendered long after the development and use of some new search technique. For
example, Professor Orin Kerr observes: "Pen registers were in widespread use by
the 1960s, but the Supreme Court did not pass on whether their use violated the
Fourth Amendment until 1979."'sI As the power and variety of sense-enhanced search
devices increases exponentially, court decisions may be unable to keep pace with
these changes.8 2

A number of factors will delay the time when courts rule on a search conducted
through use of a new technology. First, law enforcement authorities must initiate a
prosecution based in part on the new technology. If no such prosecution is brought,
79 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000 & Supp.112002).
80
81

Solove, supra note 47, at 766.
Kerr, supra note 64, at 869 (citations omitted). In 1979, the Supreme Court concluded

that the use of a pen register was not a Fourth Amendment "search." Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
82 Kerr, supra note 64, at 869 ("By the time courts decide how a technology should be
regulated ... the factual record of the case may be outdated, reflecting older technology
rather than more recent developments.").
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courts typically will not have an opportunity to rule on the sense-enhancing
technology.83 Even if a prosecution is initiated, usually the prosecution will end in
a plea bargain.' This plea bargain may occur without a court ever ruling on the
new technology.
Now assume that the prosecution brings a case, no plea bargain occurs, and
the case actually goes to trial. A trial judge must rule on the legality of the senseenhanced search. However, most attorneys never will learn of this ruling. Federal
trial courts publish few of their rulings. 5 State trial courts publish their decisions
86
even more rarely.
If the defendant is acquitted, the case will end in the trial court.87 Even if the
defendant is convicted, the defendant may enter into a sentencing agreement and
waive his right to appeal.88 If so, the case again will end in the trial court.
The sense-enhanced search issue will reach an appeals court only if the defendant
is convicted and decides to appeal. However, even if an appeals court rules on the
legality of the new technology, the ruling may not provide a definitive answer.
Other appeals courts in the state or federal system may reach different results.
Ultimately, a definitive Fourth Amendment ruling will come only from the
United States Supreme Court. But even once a case has reached the appeals courts
and a defendant has petitioned for review, the Supreme Court has discretion about
whether to hear the case.89 By the time that the Supreme Court Justices finally
Federal courts may not decide cases when there is no case or controversy. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
' Over ninety percent of all criminal cases end in a plea bargain. See, e.g., GEORGE
83

FISHER,

PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH 223 (2003) (noting that the current guilty plea rate is

ninety-four percent); Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of
Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 697 (2002)
("[O]ver ninety percent of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas .... ").
85 See Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forestfor a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New
FederalRule ofAppellate Procedure32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705,706 n.3 (2006) (describing
how district court opinions are not precedential, and thus, have no reason to be published).
86 See, e.g., Anthony R. Benedetto, The Impact on "The Vanishing Trial" If People of
Faith Were Faithful to Religious Principles of Settling Disputes Without Litigation, 6
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 253, 270 (2006) ("[T]he overwhelming majority of state trial court
opinions are unpublished.. .. "); David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past,Present,
and Future of the GeneralAcceptanceTest, 41 JURIMErRICs 385, 389 (2001) ("[Mjost state
court opinions, particularly at the trial court level, are unpublished .. ").
87 The Constitution forbids a retrial of an acquitted criminal defendant. See U.S. CONST.

amend. V.
88 See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 211 (2005) ("For well over a decade, anecdotal evidence
has suggested that appeal waivers have become increasingly frequent in federal cases.").
89 See, e.g., LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: How THE SUPREME COURT
SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 4 (2001) (reporting that the

Supreme Court agrees to review only about one percent of the cases that reach the Court
through a petition for certiorari).
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rule on the legality of a new sense-enhanced search technology, that technology
may be outdated."
Congress and state legislatures are able to act more quickly. As law enforcement
agencies adopt new technologies, legislators can regulate that technology promptly.
However, fast decisions are not necessarily prudent decisions. The deliberate
judicial process has the advantage of encouraging equally deliberate decisions. By
the time a Fourth Amendment case finally reaches the Supreme Court, all arguments
about the particular search procedure probably have been discussed somewhere in
the lower courts. 9'
In contrast, legislators may act in haste without giving complete consideration
to the advantages or disadvantages of various technology regulations. For example,
the Patriot Act seemed driven by the need of elected officials to respond to the World
Trade Center disaster of September 11, as opposed to a careful and measured attempt
to regulate new technologies. Rather than a careful consideration of competing
concerns, Professor Solove writes that the Patriot Act "was rushed through Congress
in great haste." 92
For scholars who prefer judicial or legislative solutions, the appropriate speed
of response to sense-enhanced searches represents another point of contention. Those
favoring legislative regulation contrast the slow pace of judicial action with a more
rapid possible response from legislators. Those favoring judicial regulation through
the Fourth Amendment describe judicial decisions as careful and deliberate, and
legislative decisions as sometimes hasty.
3. Inflexibility Versus Inaction
In regulating sense-enhanced searches, courts have relatively limited Fourth
Amendment tools to work with.93 The strongest Fourth Amendment limitation is to
require that law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant before initiating a search. 4
To obtain a warrant, the officers must have probable cause.9 5 If a warrant is not
9 See Kerr, supra note 64, at 868 ("Fourth Amendment rules... tend to lag behind
parallel statutory rules and current technologies by at least a decade .... ").
"' See Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DuKE L.J. 787, 790 (1999) (noting
how judicial deliberation in Fourth Amendment cases provides "protection against
intemperate decisionmaking").
92 Solove, supra note 47, at 770-71; see also Donald L. Doernberg, "Can You HearMe
Now? ": ExpectationsofPrivacy,FalseFriends,and the PerilsofSpeaking Under the Supreme
Court's FourthAmendment Jurisprudence,39 IND. L. REV. 253, 288 (2006) ("Congress
passed the USA Patriot Act in haste in 2001 as a response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11.").
93

See Kerr, supranote 64, at 873 (noting that it is difficult for courts to develop "flexible

rules under the Fourth Amendment").
94 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
95 See id.
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required, a court may hold that law enforcement officers must establish probable
cause or reasonable suspicion. If a search technique raises few Fourth Amendment
concerns, courts may permit indiscriminate use of the technique. If law enforcement
officers violate the Fourth Amendment, the remedy almost always is the exclusion
of evidence. 96
Legislators, on the other hand, have far greater flexibility in specifying both the
appropriate rules for the use of law enforcement technology, and the remedy if law
enforcement officers violate those rules. For example, under the ECPA, law enforcement officers must obtain a court order prior to the use of a pen register or a trap and
trace device. 97 Law enforcement officers may obtain this order by certifying that
98
"the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."
This standard requires far less rigorous proof than the probable cause standard for
a Fourth Amendment warrant. And unlike Fourth Amendment law, violations of
the ECPA are not subject to an exclusionary rule, which prevents juries from hearing
probative evidence. 99
However, another option available to legislators, and not courts, is the option
to do nothing. When the defense challenges a sense-enhanced search as a Fourth
Amendment violation, a court hearing a criminal case must decide the Fourth
Amendment issue.
Frequently, Congress simply has not taken any action to regulate sense-enhanced
searches.1 Further, as Professor Solove has noted, Congress has enacted legislation
governing sense-enhanced searches sporadically.'' The ECPA was adopted in 1986.1°2
The Patriot Act was adopted in 2001.03 In the fifteen-year interim, Congress did not
enact any new major legislation on sense-enhanced searches, despite the rise of the
Internet during this fifteen-year period."°4
In part, congressional inaction may occur because legislators view courts as the
dominant regulatory agency on search and seizure questions. However, legislators
also may fear that sense-enhanced search regulations will be politically sensitive
and politically risky. For advocates of law enforcement and the war on terror, any
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (Supp. II 2002).
98 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2000).
99 See Solove, supra note 47, at 756.
100 See supra text accompanying note 61-63.
'01 Solove, supra note 47, at 770-71.
1"2 Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
103 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
' Congress did adopt some modest amendments to the ECPA during this fifteen-year
period. See Solove, supra note 47, at 770-71.
9

97
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legislation that restricts the use of sense-enhancing technology will be criticized as
protecting hoodlums and terrorists. For civil liberties advocates, any legislation that
liberalizes the use of sense-enhanced technology will amount to an invasion of
privacy and liberty. All too often, the politically expedient response is to do nothing.
The competence of different branches to regulate sense-enhanced searches
represents another point of contention among scholars. For scholars who favor
legislative regulation, Congress possesses greater flexibility in crafting federal
statutes, as compared with court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. For
scholars who favor judicial regulation through the Fourth Amendment, Congress
has demonstrated an uneven response and frequent inaction in the face of new
search techniques.
D. Summary

Sense-enhanced searches form an increasingly important component of the
investigative techniques used by law enforcement. In its attempts to apply the Fourth
Amendment to these new search techniques, the Supreme Court has struggled to
devise a coherent methodology."°5
Perhaps as a result of the Court's struggles, sense-enhanced searches today are
increasingly regulated by congressional statutes." Scholars disagree on whether
this move toward statutory regulation is a positive or negative development.0 "
Arguments on the proper regulation of technology often have focused on the
institutional capabilities of legislators and courts, as opposed to an examination of
the Fourth Amendment itself. However, the original understanding of the Fourth
Amendment should be a critical component of this debate.
The remainder of this Article endorses the case for statutory regulation of
sense-enhanced searches. My argument is in no way based on the functional
superiority of Congress over the courts. Instead, the argument derives from the limits
of the Fourth Amendment.
As the next section of this Article indicates, the Fourth Amendment never was
intended to regulate anything like sense-enhanced searches. With respect to such
high-technology searches, the amendment should be almost entirely irrelevant.

II. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING

OF UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

In discussions of sense-enhanced searches, modem analysis tends to assume
that the Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment as a general regulation of all
searches and seizures. Such an assumption is incorrect.
'05
106
107

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.C.
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The Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment exclusively to regulate house
searches. " Specifically, the Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment solely to prohibit
physical entries into a house pursuant to a general warrant, or no warrant at all." 9
When they enacted the Fourth Amendment, the Framers did not intend to regulate
other types of searches or seizures.
Sense-enhanced searches typically do not involve a physical trespass into a
residence, even when law enforcement officers are using such searches to gather
evidence about a residence." 0 Attempts to regulate sense-enhanced searches through
the Fourth Amendment are doomed to incoherence. With respect to such searches,
the amendment should be simply irrelevant.
A. Origins
William Cuddihy observes that the concept of unreasonable searches and seizures
did not originate out of attempts to control government power, but instead began
with laws that sought to prevent private citizens from breaking and entering into
houses."' Professor Cuddihy writes that as early as the seventh century, English
codes "penalized severely those who invaded a neighbor's premises or provoked a
2
disturbance within it.""1
By the thirteenth century, the laws that prohibited housebreaking had developed
into the crime of "hamsocn."' 3 Professor Cuddihy describes this crime as "among
the more serious of crimes in medieval England, one hundred shillings being the
usual fine for it."' 14 By the end of the sixteenth century, the crime of "hamsocn" had
been transformed into more modern codes that proscribed burglary, housebreaking,
and trespass."15
Prior to 1485, English government officials rarely searched private houses." 6
But after 1485, England's Tudor monarchs expanded the justifications for house
10'

Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv.

547, 551 (1999).
109Id.

...
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-41 (2001) (striking down the
warrantless use of a thermal imaging unit to measure the temperature inside of a residence,
which did not involve a physical trespass into the residence); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 213-15 (1986) (upholding the warrantless aerial surveillance of a residential backyard,
which did not involve a physical trespass).
...William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 31-35
(1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Claremont Graduate University) (on file with author).
112 Id. at 32.
"a Id. at 33.
114

id.

"5

Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 75.

116
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for
searches."i7 Government agents now possessed broad powers to search houses
20

9
evidence of customs violations,"' religious heresy, " and political dissent.
As house searches by government officials became more frequent, English thought
began to assert that certain types of government house searches were unreasonable
and unlawful. 2 ' As Professor Cuddihy summarizes this movement, "Elizabethan
Englishmen began to insist that their houses were castles for the paradoxical reason
that the castle-like security that those houses had afforded from intrusion was vanishing.
As the violence and frequency of searches escalated, the perception that some types
122
of search and seizure were unreasonable appeared."'
This historical backdrop sheds considerable light on the eighteenth-century
American opposition to unreasonable searches and seizures, which culminated in the
Fourth Amendment. When eighteenth-century Americans spoke of unreasonable
searches, they were criticizing one particular government practice-the unlawful
trespass into houses.

B. The PrincipleControversies RegardingGovernment Search Powers
Prior to the enactment of the Fourth Amendment, criticisms of unreasonable
searches and seizures focused on searches of residences conducted pursuant to a
general warrant.'23 The term "general warrant" referred to warrants with either of
two deficiencies. 12 A warrant was inadequate if the document failed to specify the
places to be searched or the things to be seized. 25 A warrant also would be inadequate
126
if the document lacked sufficient evidentiary support.
As noted by Nelson Lasson, Thomas Davies, and others, discussion of unreasonable
searches in the late eighteenth century primarily focused on three controversies-the
John Wilkes cases in England, Paxton's case in Boston, and American reactions to

117

H8

Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 100-02.

1"9Id. at 105-06.
120 Id. at 111-18.
121 Id. at 127-28.

Id. at 128.
Article X of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 adopted the first American
constitutional provision to regulate searches and seizures. Article X contains a straightforward prohibition on general warrants. See VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. X, reprinted
122
123

in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER

ORGANIC LAWS 3814 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) (asserting that general warrants "are
grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted").
124 Davies, supra note 108, at 558 n.12.
125 Id.
126

Id.
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the English Townshend Act.'27 All three controversies arose out of physical searches
28
of homes pursuant to general warrants.
1. The John Wilkes Cases
The John Wilkes cases grew out of a letter published anonymously by opposition
politician John Wilkes, which was highly critical of the English Tory government.129
In a general warrant, the Tory Secretary of State authorized English officers to
search any places that might contain evidence identifying the author of the libelous
letter. 3 Ultimately, the officers searched at least five houses and arrested at least
forty-nine people pursuant to this general warrant.'
Wilkes and his supporters responded with a number of trespass and false imprisonment suits. 3 2 In a series of decisions issued between 1763 and 1769, English courts
ruled that the house searches conducted pursuant to the general warrant violated
133
English common law.
The John Wilkes cases focused exclusively on the impropriety of house searches.34
These cases did not suggest that similar searches of shops, warehouses, or vessels
would violate common law principles. For example, in an opinion that was highly
critical of the general warrant, Chief Justice Pratt wrote: "To enter a man's house
by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the
Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour;
35
it was a most daring public attack made upon the liberty of the subject."'1

127

See, e.g., NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH

43-76 (1937) (discussing the John
Wilkes cases, Paxton's case, and the Townshend Act); Davies, supra note 108, at 561-67
(noting general agreement that these three controversies represent the most important events
that resulted in the adoption of the Fourth Amendment).
128LASSON, supra note 127, at 43-76.
"2For a detailed account of the John Wilkes cases, see Cuddihy, supra note 111, at
886-927.
130 Id. at 887.
131 Id. at 893.
332 Id. at 894.
133See Money v. Leach, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B.); Entick v. Carrington, (1765)
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.); Huckle v.
Money, (1763) 95 Eng Rep. 768 (K.B.).
'3 See, e.g., Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818 (holding that "to enter a man's house, search for
and take away all his books and papers" violated common law principles); Wilkes, 98 Eng.
Rep. at 498 (when "[t]he defendants claimed a right... to force persons houses, break open
escrutores, seize their papers, &c. upon a general warrant," these actions were "totally
subversive of the liberty of the subject").
13'Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769.
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONsTTrUTON
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2. Paxton's Case
Charles Paxton was a Boston customs officer. 36 In 1761, the Boston Surveyor
General of Customs sought to review a writ of assistance, which Paxton had received
from the Superior Court in Boston.'37 The writ of assistance was the American
3
equivalent of the English general warrant. 1
In January 1761, a group of Massachusetts merchants challenged Paxton' s writ
before the Superior Court in Boston.13 1 On behalf of the merchants, attorney James
Otis, Jr., argued that the writ violated common law principles." 4°
In challenging Paxton's writ, Otis began by noting that "the freedom of one's
house" was among "the most essential branches of English liberty."'' Otis argued
that the writ of assistance violated common law principles because customs officials
"may enter our houses when they please... may break locks, bars and every thing
in their way-and whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court
can inquire. '
Otis lost the case. In November 1761, the Superior Court in Boston approved the
continued use of the writs of assistance. 143 Nonetheless, Otis's argument against the
writs of assistance was a major event, which fueled the American movement for
independence from England.'"
As was true in the John Wilkes cases, Paxton's case focused exclusively on the
illegality of house searches pursuant to general warrants. 145 Otis did not challenge
Otis's argument exclusively challenged
searches of warehouses or seizures of ships.'"
47
1
residences.
into
physical intrusions
136

137
138

Cuddihy, supra note 111, at 760.
Id. at 761-64.
Id. at 759. The writ was named a writ of assistance because the writ compelled all

persons present to assist customs officers in a search for customs violations. See Davies,
supra note 108, at 561 n.18.
13 Cuddihy, supra note 111, at 764.
"" Id. at 765; see M. H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 344 (1978).
141 SMrrH, supra note 140, at 344.
Id.
143 Cuddihy, supra note
142

111, at 798.
" According to John Adams, during Otis's argument "American independence was then

and there born." 10 THE WORKS OFJOHN ADAMs, SECOND PRESIDENTOFTHE UNITED STATES

247 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1856). But cf. Davies, supra note 108, at 562 n.20 (noting
that although "Otis's argument was widely known in Boston," news of the argument may not
have reached beyond Massachusetts).
145 Davies, supra note 108, at 601-02. Otis's decision only to challenge house searches
is particularly noteworthy. Otis's clients were "merchants who also owned ships and warehouses." Id. at 602.
'4 Id. at
147 id.

602.
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3. American Opposition to the Townshend Act
In the Townshend Act of 1767, the British Parliament reauthorized the use of writs
of assistance by American customs officials. 48 But after 1767, as a result of popular
149
resistance, colonial officers obtained and enforced few of these writs.
As was the case with the earlier search and seizure controversies, opposition to the
50
Townshend Act focused on house searches conducted pursuant to general warrants.
For example, in a 1774 address to the American people, the Continental Congress
complained that customs officers could "break open and enter houses without the
authority of any civil magistrate founded on legal information."'' Similarly, in a
1774 letter to the inhabitants of Quebec, the Congress warned that British customs
officers would break into "houses, the scenes of domestic peace and comfort and
152
called the castles of English subjects in the books of their law."'
4. Summary
More than anything else, three controversies led to the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment-the John Wilkes cases, Paxton's case, and the Townshend Act. In each
case, opponents of government search powers focused their criticism exclusively on
physical entries of houses pursuant to general warrants. Critics did not argue against
searches of shops, warehouses, or other commercial structures-even though
English agents certainly did enter these locations in search of customs violations.
Instead, discussion of unreasonable searches focused entirely on house searches.
C. Early Commentaries on UnreasonableSearches
Like statesmen and attorneys, legal commentators who discussed unreasonable
searches and seizures referred almost exclusively to house searches. In his 1644
'

Cuddihy, supra note 111, at 1040.
I at 1046. As Professor William Cuddihy describes the implementation of the
Id.

Townshend Act: "In only a few colonies did the courts issue the writs as general search
warrants, and the massive searches that those writs authorized were never implemented on
an effective scale." Id.
50 For example, at a Boston town meeting in 1772, Samuel Adams attacked the writs of
assistance with the following statement: "[O]ur homes and even our bed chambers, are
exposed to be ransacked, our boxes chests & trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by
wretches.., whenever they are pleased to say they suspect there are in the house wares etc.
for which the dutys have not been paid." A STATE OF THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONISTS,
reprinted in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN

REVOLUTION,

1763-1776, at 243 (Merrill Jensen

ed., 1967) (report typically attributed to Samuel Adams).
'.' Cuddihy, supra note 111, at 1116.
152 Id. at 1117.

2007]

SENSE-ENHANCED SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

485

treatise, English commentator Sir Edward Coke described unreasonable searches
in the following terms: "One or more justice or justices of peace cannot make a warrant
upon a bare surmise to break any man's house to search for a felon, or for stoln [sic]
goods... ."" In his 1721 treatise, Sir Matthew Hale agreed that general warrants

could not serve as a justification "to break open any man's house. "154
In America, Thomas Cooley was one of the first commentators to write extensively
about the Fourth Amendment. Cooley described the Fourth Amendment as follows:
"The maxim that 'every man's house is his castle' is made a part of our constitutional law in the clause prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures .... "",
Cooley continued that the Fourth Amendment constituted a response to "the
unwarrantable intrusion of executive agents into the houses and among the private
56

papers of individuals."'1

The statements of early American and English commentators are consistent with
other contemporary statements about unreasonable searches and seizures. In short,
the Fourth Amendment was intended only to regulate physical intrusions into
houses and not other types of searches or seizures.
D. The FourthAmendment Did Not Apply Outside House Searches
Without question, the Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment primarily to
prohibit house searches pursuant to general warrants. But did the Framers also intend
to regulate searches away from the home? While this question cannot be answered
definitively, most of the evidence suggests that the Framers did not intend to
regulate searches and seizures outside of the home.
1. The Federal Experience
' it is very difficult
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Boyd v. UnitedStates, 57
ways, this dearth
In
some
Amendment.
apply
the
Fourth
to find any federal cases that
of cases is unsurprising. During the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth

113

SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

176 (London, W. Clarke and Sons 1817). Coke also wrote: "[F]orjustices of peace to make
warrants upon surmises, for breaking the houses of any subjects to search for felons, or stoln
[sic] goods, is against [the] Magna Carta. . .

."

Id. at 177. Coke's treatise was originally

published in 1644. Davies, supra note 108, at 578 n.74.
15 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 149 (Sollom Emlyn
ed., Professional Books, Ltd. 1971) (1736).
"I THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299-300
(Boston, Little, Brown and Company 1868) (citation omitted).
156 Id. at 300.
151116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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century, most criminal laws were enacted by the states, not the federal government. 5 8
Therefore, one plausibly might attribute the lack of federal Fourth Amendment cases
to a lack of federal searching and seizing that accompanies criminal investigations.
However, the early federal government did seize ships, with some of the resulting
litigation reaching the Supreme Court. In the 1804 case of Little v. Barreme,519 the
Supreme Court reviewed a ship seizure resulting out of a law that prohibited trading
6 an 1824 case, the Supreme Court
with France."0 In The Apollon, "'
reviewed a ship
62
seizure that arose out of alleged customs violations.
Neither of these cases found a Fourth Amendment violation. But more importantly,
neither the Justices nor the litigants even discussed the Fourth Amendment in these
cases. 163 These omissions strongly support the following inference: Both lawyers
and judges understood that the Fourth Amendment simply did not apply to ship
searches and seizures.
This argument is further supported by early legislation. In the 1789 Collections
Act, Congress approved the warrantless search of vessels for customs violations.'6
If the Framers had intended for the Fourth Amendment to govern searches and
seizures other than house searches, why would Congress need to enact a statute that
governed ship searches? In fact, both the ship seizure cases and the Collections Act
support the argument that the Fourth Amendment was never intended to apply
65
outside of house searches.
2. The State Experience
The concept of unreasonable searches and seizures appeared almost as rarely
in the state courts as in the federal courts. Admittedly, during the eighteenth century
and the nineteenth century, the federal Fourth Amendment only applied to the
federal government. 66
'
158

See, e.g., LAsSON, supranote 127, at 106 (during the nineteenth century, "the limited

criminal jurisdiction of the Federal Government was not exercised by Congress except in
minor instances"); Sara Sun Beale, FederalizingCrime:Assessing the Impact on the Federal
Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 39, 40 (1996) (explaining that federal
criminal law initially had a very limited scope).
"9 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
'60 See id. at 177-79.
161 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 362 (1824).
162 Id. at 364, 370-72.
163 See id.; Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) at 177-79.
164 Collections Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 14, 1 Stat. 29, 40.
165 But cf Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1925) (asserting that with the
passage of the 1789 Collections Act, Congress indicated that the Fourth Amendment applied
to ship searches).
'66 See Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76 (1855) (rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge to a Maryland state statute because the Fourth Amendment applied only to
the federal government).
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However, during this period, most state constitutions contained search and seizure
provisions using language very similar or identical to the federal Fourth Amendment.'67 Nonetheless, published state court opinions rarely discussed these state
constitutional search and seizure provisions.'" In both the federal courts and the state
courts, constitutional search and seizure provisions probably were mentioned in
fewer than fifty nineteenth-century cases. 69 And in those rare cases where a creative
provision, courts typically
attorney did invoke a constitutional search and seizure
1 70
dismissed the argument with very little discussion.
As was the case at the federal level, search and seizure law in the early states
typically was regulated by statute, rather than by court interpretations of a constitutional
provision. With the notable exception of house searches, the vast majority of police
investigations were permitted without a warrant. 7 '
In those rare situations where early American law did require a warrant to search
outside of the home, the source of that warrant requirement was found in statutes,
not court decisions. For example, a 1786 Rhode Island statute required that federal
tax agents must obtain a specific warrant before the agents could search a "DwellingHouse, Store, Ware-house, or other Building."'' 7 In another 1786 statute, Delaware
required that state agents must obtain a warrant before searching buildings for cargo
7
stolen from shipwrecked vessels. 1
In the Michigan Supreme Court case of Weimer v. Bunbury,174 Justice Thomas
Cooley's opinion clearly indicates why state constitutional provisions were not
invoked in most search and seizure cases. 175 Weimer involved a challenge to a

See Davies, supra note 108, at 674-86.
Id. at 611-19.
169 id.
170 See, e.g., Banks v. Farewell, 38 Mass. (17 Pick.) 156, 159-60 (1838) (holding that a
warrantless search of a shop did not violate the Massachusetts Constitution, which prohibited
unreasonable searches and seizures); Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 59-60 (1817) (rejecting
the argument that a warrantless arrest violated a New Hampshire constitutional provision,
which prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures); Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 315, 318 (Pa.
1814) (rejecting the argument that a warrantless arrest violated a Pennsylvania constitutional
provision, which prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures).
171 "Warrantless searches, then as now, were the rule rather than the exception, and each
of the thirteen colonies, and then states, as a common statutory practice, authorized them."
Gerard V. Bradley, Present at the Creation?A CriticalGuide to Weeks v. United States
and Its Progeny, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1031, 1041 (1986); see also id. at 1041 nn. 64-65
(citing statutes).
171 Cuddihy, supra note 111, at 1292.
173Id. at 1293.
" 30 Mich. 201 (1874).
175 Justice Cooley was also the author of an important treatise on the United States
Constitution, which described the Fourth Amendment as regulating house searches. See
CooLEY, supra note 155.
167
161
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Michigan state statute, providing for a "warrant" that authorized the repossession
of property in tax delinquency cases. 17 6 The Weimer plaintiff argued that this statute
violated a Michigan state constitutional provision, which proscribed unreasonable
177
searches and seizures.
According to Justice Cooley, the repossession statute did not violate the state
constitutional search and seizure provision. The constitutional search and seizure
provision was intended for "something quite different from an open and public levy
upon property after the usual method of execution levies."'7 Instead, the "main
purpose" of the state constitutional search and seizure provision "was to make
sacred the privacy of the citizen's dwelling and person against everything but
process issued upon a showing of legal cause for invading it."' 79 In short, the state
constitutional provision that prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures was
simply inapplicable.
E. Summary
Discussions of unreasonable searches and seizures before, during, and soon after
the enactment of the Fourth Amendment focused on a single, discrete issue-the
need to prevent house searches pursuant to a general warrant, or no warrant at all.'
Based on the historical record, it seems most likely that the Fourth Amendment was
enacted solely to regulate searches involving a physical trespass into a residence.
The record also indicates that the Fourth Amendment was not applicable to other
types of searches and seizures.' 8 ' In the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth

177

Weimer, 30 Mich. at 210.
Id. at 208.

178

id.

179

Id.

176

See supra Part II.A-D.
Amar advocates an interpretation of Fourth Amendment history that is quite
different from the account presented in this article. See, e.g., Amar, FourthAmendment First
Principles,supra note 77; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131, 1175-81 (1991) [hereinafter Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution]; Akhil
Reed Amar, The FourthAmendment, Boston, and the Writs ofAssistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 53 (1996). Professor Amar's historical argument rests on two critical propositions.
First, like the current Supreme Court, Professor Amar asserts that the Fourth Amendment was
intended to impose a global reasonableness requirement on almost all government evidence
gathering activities. Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples,supra note 77, at 801-04.
Second, Professor Amar asserts that the Framers actually sought to limit searches
pursuant to any warrant, general or specific. Id. at 771-80. According to Professor Amar, the
Framers did not view the warrant process as protecting against unreasonable searches.
Instead, civil trespass suits offered the primary protection from such searches. Id. at 774.
Professor Amar contends that the Framers sought to limit warrants, because a warrant would
provide "an absolute defense in any subsequent trespass suit." Id. Professor Amar concludes,
180

181 Akhil

"[jiudges and warrants are the heavies, not the heroes, of our story." Amar, The Bill of
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century, historical precedents, contemporary controversies, and scholarly commentaries
2
all focused on house searches.1
Rights as a Constitution, supra at 1179; see also TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN
CONSTrrUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL
AND FREE PRESS 41 (1969) (arguing that the Framers viewed all warrants as "an enemy").
Although Professor Amar' s account is creative and engaging, his contentions often seem
at odds with the historical record. To take just one example, when early American legislatures
passed statutes regulating searches and seizures, those statutes sometimes included a warrant
requirement. See, e.g., Excise Act of 1791, ch. 15, § 32, 1 Stat. 199, 207 (requiring that federal
customs officers must obtain a warrant before the officers searched certain types of buildings
for spirits that were concealed "with intent to evade the duties thereby imposed upon them");
Davies, supra note 108, at 681-83 (noting that in 1780 and 1785, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted statutes that required specific warrants for house searches). Although Professor
Amar contends that the Framers sought to limit searches pursuant to warrants, these early
American statutes requiring warrants contradict Professor Amar's contention.
A number of Fourth Amendment scholars disagree with Professor Amar's reading of
Fourth Amendment history. For critiques of Professor Amar' s arguments, see Morgan Cloud,
Searching Through History; Searchingfor History, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1707, 1739 (1996)
(Amar "selectively deploys incomplete fragments of the historical record to advance a partisan
thesis"); Davies, supra note 108, at 575 n.63 ("Amar is an engaging writer, but his treatment
of text and history is often loose and uninformed."); Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the
FourthAmendment: A HistoricalReview, 77 B.U. L. REv. 925,929 (1997) ("Amar provides
an incomplete account of the [Fourth] Amendment's history."). For an extended discussion
and evaluation of Professor Amar's historical argument, see Steinberg, AkhilAmar and Fourth
Amendment History, supra note 5.
82 Thomas Davies has advanced a reading of Fourth Amendment history that is very similar
to the interpretation presented in this article. Professor Davies appropriately emphasizes that
the historical concerns resulting in the Fourth Amendment "were almost exclusively about
the need to ban house searches under general warrants." Davies, supra note 108, at 551; see
also id. at 642-50 (emphasizing the sanctity of the home in eighteenth-century America).
However, I disagree with Professor Davies on at least two points. Professor Davies
concludes that the sole purpose of the Fourth Amendment was "banning Congress from
authorizing the use of general warrants." Id. at 724. "In other words, the Framers did not
address warrantless intrusions at all in the Fourth Amendment or in the earlier state
Id. at 551.
provisions ....
In concluding that the Fourth Amendment did not address warrantless searches, Professor
Davies notes the absence of eighteenth-century protests about warrantless searches. Id. at
603. However, the lack of debate about warrantless house searches likely occurred because
in early America, "the common law apparently provided no justification for a search of a
house beyond the ministerial execution of a valid search warrant." Id. at 649. In other words,
everyone agreed that warrantless house searches were impermissible.
According to Professor Davies's reading of the Framers' intent, a search of a house
pursuant to a general warrant would be an "unreasonable search," as that term is used in the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 577 n.67, 600. However, Professor Davies asserts that a warrantless
house search would not be an unreasonable search, at least for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Id. at 601, 610-11. Given the profound common law tradition that proscribed unauthorized
entries into houses, I cannot agree with Professor Davies's conclusion that the Fourth
Amendment did not proscribe warrantless house searches.
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But for the sake of argument, assume that the Framers did intend for the Fourth
Amendment to govern police investigations other than house searches. Because
contemporary discussions focused exclusively on house searches, framing-era
discourse provides no clues about how the Fourth Amendment would apply in cases
that did not involve a physical trespass into a residence.
Perhaps for this reason, the Supreme Court's attempts to apply the Fourth
Amendment outside of house searches have a highly arbitrary quality. Sometimes,
the Court has permitted searches only when police officers possess probable cause. 83
Sometimes, the Court has permitted searches under the less demanding "reasonable
suspicion" standard.184 And sometimes, the Court has permitted searches that are
completely random, without any heightened level of suspicion. 5
Professor Davies and I also disagree on the implications of the Framers' original intent
for current Fourth Amendment doctrine. Professor Davies believes that a return to the original
understanding of the Fourth Amendment "would subvert the purpose the Framers had in
mind when they adopted the text." Id. at 741. Professor Davies largely accepts the Supreme
Court's rewriting of the Fourth Amendment, because today's law enforcement officers
exercise "a level of discretionary authority that the Framers would not have expected a
warrantless officer could exercise unless general warrants had been made legal." Id.

I agree with Professor Davies that unrestrained police discretion is undesirable. However,
judicial activism is not the only potential source for police restraint. Police discretion could
be constrained by elected officials who supervise police departments, by statutes, or by
amendments to state constitutions or the federal Constitution.
In short, having nine appointed Supreme Court Justices reinvent the Fourth Amendment
based on their personal views about "unreasonable searches and seizures" is not the most
sensible way to regulate police discretion. In my opinion, Fourth Amendment doctrine is such
a mess because well-intentioned judges have invoked the Amendment in situations where it
never was intended to apply. See supra Part L.A (discussing Fourth Amendment decisions
that seem arbitrary and incoherent).
183 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (holding
that when police
officers possess probable cause, the officers may conduct a warrantless search of a car
stopped on a public highway); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155 (1925) (same).
184 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (holding that a high
school vice principal could search a student's purse, when the vice principal had "reasonable
grounds" to believe that the student had violated a school rule); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30 (1968) (holding that when a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that any
suspect is armed and dangerous, the officer may "conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him").
In the Fourth Amendment itself, the term "probable cause" appears only as a limitation
on the issuance of warrants, not as a justification for warrantless searches. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IV (providing that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause"). The term

"reasonable suspicion" is not mentioned in the Fourth Amendment. See id.
185 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,826 (2002) (upholding
a random urinalysis
drug testing policy, which applied to high school students who participated in competitive
extracurricular activities); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-55 (1990)
(allowing police officers to stop vehicles randomly at a fixed sobriety checkpoint).
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El. THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF AN EVOLVING FOURTH AMENDMENT
With respect to modem discussions of sense-enhanced searches, one might easily
question the relevance of the eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century Fourth
Amendment principles. The Framers of the Constitution lived in a far different world.
The Framers almost certainly could not have imagined the telephone-much less
pen registers and thermal imaging devices. As times and technologies change, why
not permit the meaning of the amendment to change with the times?
Further, modem Fourth Amendment law is premised on the notion of an evolving
amendment. The first case in my Criminal Procedure textbook and course is the 1967
Supreme Court decision in Katz v. Untied States.18 6 In holding that federal agents
must obtain a warrant before placing a wiretap on a telephone booth, Katz embraced
the concept of an evolving Fourth Amendment. 8 7 Noting that any Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement was once limited to cases involving a physical trespass, the
Katz opinion concluded that the underpinnings of the trespass precedents "have
been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated
188
can no longer be regarded as controlling."
Arguments for a growing or evolving Fourth Amendment face at least two
problems. First, given the increasing threat posed by criminal activity, the Fourth
Amendment might evolve into a provision that offers less protection, rather than
more protection. More fundamentally, although many jurists and scholars may agree
that the Fourth Amendment should evolve, defining how the amendment should
evolve presents a much more difficult question. Little, if any, consensus exists about
application of the Fourth Amendment to new search techniques. Ultimately, any
Fourth Amendment consensus may be limited to the original understanding-that law
enforcement officers ordinarily cannot physically enter a home without a warrant. 89
A. An Evolving FourthAmendment May Be a Reduced FourthAmendment

When commentators speak of an evolving Fourth Amendment, most seem to
assume that such an evolution would offer greater protection to individual liberty
and impose more restrictions on government searches and seizures." However,
recent Supreme Court decisions do not necessarily support this assumption. On the
one hand, the Court typically has held that the Fourth Amendment applies to new search
186

389 U.S. 347 (1967); see

JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ & WELSH S. WHITE, CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 4-8 (4th ed.

2001) (using the edited version of Katz v. United States).
187 Katz, 389 U.S. at 358-59.
188 Id. at 353.
189 See supra Part II.
"9o See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
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techniques.' 9 ' But in cases involving aerial surveillance,' 92 sobriety checkpoints,'9 3
and random drug testing,"9 the Court usually has upheld the new search technique
against Fourth Amendment challenges.' 9 5 Such decisions suggest that an evolving
Fourth Amendment may not in fact provide greater security to individuals.
The Fourth Amendment implicitly balances the right of the people "to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" against the state interest in investigating
criminal activity. 9 6 The amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures,
but only "unreasonable searches and seizures.
In early America, law enforcement interests were relatively modest. At this time,
law enforcement efforts most frequently focused on the crime of smuggling.'98 By
evading customs duties, smugglers deprived government authorities of significant
revenues) 99 Nonetheless, smuggling was rarely a violent crime and did not threaten
a wholesale loss of life.2 °°
In contrast, modern law enforcement efforts deal with far more dangerous
criminal behavior. In 2005, more than 16,000 people were murdered in the United

' See supraPart I. But cf United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that
a canine sniff is not a search and is not covered by the Fourth Amendment).
"9 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986) (upholding
warrantless aerial surveillance of a manufacturing compound); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding that when police officers used an airplane to view marijuana
plants growing in a fenced backyard, the officers did not engage in a Fourth Amendment
search, and the officers did not need to obtain a warrant).

193See,

e.g., Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-55 (1990) (fixed

sobriety checkpoint on a Michigan road did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
'94 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 835-38 (2002) (random drug tests of
students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities did not violate the Fourth
Amendment); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (random
blood, breath, and urine tests of railway workers following a major train accident did not
violate the Fourth Amendment).
"I There are exceptions. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001)

(random drug testing program for women who received pre-natal care violated the Fourth
Amendment); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46-48 (2000) (random auto
stops at a roadway narcotics checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment).
196 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
197Id.
198 LASSON, supranote 127, at 51-78 (noting that the Fourth Amendment was a response

to house searches by customs agents, who were seeking smuggled goods); see also JACOB W.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 20 (1966) (stating that intrusions by British customs officers "had done
violence to the ancient maxim that 'A man's house is his castle."').
At least in southern states, a second focal point of law enforcement efforts was the
capture and return of fugitive slaves. See Cuddihy, supra note 111, at 1280-82.
199See LASSON, supra note 127, at 51-78.
2o0 See id.
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States. 2 ' Further, law enforcement officials confront the possibility of terrorist
attacks that could result in a massive loss of life and destruction of property. For
example, about 3000 people died in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World
20 2
Trade Center.
Given the weight of these law enforcement interests, the direction of any Fourth
Amendment evolution is highly problematic. A wholesale revision of Fourth Amendment doctrine would not necessarily result in greater Fourth Amendment regulation
of sense-enhanced searches or other police investigations that use new technology.
To the contrary, any such evolution may mean a reduction in the protections offered
by the amendment.
B. The Lack of ConsensusAbout FourthAmendment Evolution

Statements that the Fourth Amendment should change or evolve with the times
are commonplace.2 3 While commentators often express that the amendment should
"grow" or "evolve," one finds considerably less agreement about how the amendment
should evolve. As two relatively recent cases illustrate, the lack of a broad consensus
about the direction of Fourth Amendment growth dooms the possibility of a coherent
new version of the amendment.
In Kyllo v. United States,2°4 the Supreme Court struck down the warrantless use
of a thermal imaging unit to record temperatures emanating from a residence.2 5
Writing for a five Justice majority, Justice Antonin Scalia announced the rule that
where "the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion," the government has engaged in a search that ordinarily will require a
warrant. 2°6 Although the thermal imaging unit was located in a car parked on a public
street, Justice Scalia worried that a refusal to regulate the thermal imaging unit could
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2005: Murder, http://www
.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/offenses/violentcrime/murderhomicide.html (last visited Nov. 12,2007).
201

202 See W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Recollection Bias and the Combat of
Terrorism, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 38 (2005).
203 For arguments that modem notions of reasonableness should influence Fourth Amend-

ment doctrine, see Yale Kamisar, The Writings of John Barker Waite and Thomas Davies on
the Search and Seizure ExclusionaryRule, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1821, 1865 (2002) (arguing
that "changing times and changing circumstances seriously undermined the presuppositions
and expectations regarding the drafting and adoption of the search and seizure provision");
Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 824
(1994) (asserting that "the construction of the Fourth Amendment's 'reasonableness' clause
should properly change over time to accommodate constitutional purposes more general than
the Framers' specific intentions").
204 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
205 id.

206 Id. at 40.
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"leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-including imaging
technology that could discern all human activity in the home."2 7 Justice Scalia also
wrote that the thermal imaging unit could disclose private information, such as "what
hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath-a detail that
many would consider 'intimate.""'20
Writing for four dissenters, Justice John Paul Stevens did not believe that the
Kyllo defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat radiating from
his residence.'1 Although federal agents had used a thermal imaging unit to measure
the temperature, Justice Stevens asserted that "the ordinary use of the senses might
enable a neighbor or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building, particularly
if it is vented."' 0 Justice Stevens argued: "Heat waves, like aromas that are generated
in a kitchen, or in a laboratory or opium den, enter the public domain if and when they
leave a building.....
A similar lack of consensus appears in Board of Education v. Earls,12 where
the Supreme Court upheld random drug tests through urinalysis for students participating in competitive extracurricular activities. Writing for a five Justice majority,
Justice Clarence Thomas asserted that student privacy interests are "limited in a
public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline,
health, and safety."2 3 According to Justice Thomas, the urine testing involved a
minimal intrusion on students' privacy.2" 4 Further, the drug tests were not "turned
over to any law enforcement authority."2 5 The harshest possible sanction from a
failed drug test would be "to limit the student's privilege of participating in
extracurricular activities. 2 t 6
Ultimately, Justice Thomas wrote that any privacy interests were outweighed
by "the importance of the governmental concern in preventing drug use by schoolchildren., 2 17 Justice Thomas concluded: "Indeed, the nationwide drug epidemic makes
the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school."2 8
Justice Thomas's reasoning in Earls did not persuade dissenting Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, or the three Justices who joined her dissent. Justice Ginsburg asserted
that when a school required random urine tests, those tests could compromise the
privacy of any "modest and shy" students who participated in extracurricular
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 38.
209 Id. at 43-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 43.
211 Id. at 43-44.
212 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
213 Id. at 830.
214 Id. at 832-33.
215 Id. at 833.
207
208

216

Id.

217

Id. at 834.
id.

218
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Earls
activities. 2' 9 Also, according to Justice Ginsburg, the school administrators in
220
had not demonstrated a significant drug abuse problem in their school district.
With respect to students involved in competitive extracurricular activities, Justice
Ginsburg was particularly skeptical about whether random drug testing would serve
any important state interest. Justice Ginsburg wrote: "Nationwide, students who
participate in extracurricular activities are significantly less likely to develop substance
abuse problems than are their less-involved peers."22 '
Split decisions such as Kyllo and Earls illustrate the lack of consensus about
how the Fourth Amendment should evolve. Who had the better arguments in these
cases-Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas for the majorities, or Justice Stevens and
Justice Ginsburg for the dissenters? Are the majority opinions of Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas really more convincing just because these Justices obtained one
more vote than the dissenters?
In the end, any Fourth Amendment "consensus" may be limited to the original
understanding of the Framers. In short, the Fourth Amendment only should proscribe
improper physical intrusions into residences, pursuant to a general warrant or no
warrant at all. With respect to new issues raised by exotic sense-enhanced search
techniques, the lack of any consensus precludes coherent regulation through the
Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION

With the rise of sense-enhanced searches, scholars have debated whether courts
or legislatures should regulate these powerful new search techniques. I have concluded
that if sense-enhanced searches are to be regulated coherently, such regulation must
come from elected legislators.
Unlike some previous commentators, I do not base this argument on functional
advantages that legislators may or may not enjoy over courts. Instead, my argument
stems from the limited reach of the Fourth Amendment. The Framers enacted the
Fourth Amendment solely to prohibit unreasonable physical intrusions into residences,
either with a general warrant or no warrant at all. The Framers never intended that
the Fourth Amendment would regulate the complex problems raised by senseenhanced searches. Nor has any new consensus emerged, which would permit
coherent regulation of sense-enhanced searches through the Fourth Amendment.
Without question, the power and precision of sense-enhanced search technologies
pose new dangers to security and liberty. But regulation of such searches must come
from elected officials and not courts. Constitutional law cannot coherently regulate
sense-enhanced searches, because the Fourth Amendment never was intended to
govern this area.
219 Id. at 847 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 850.
221

Id. at

853.

